

Freedom as the Site of the *Kehre*. Rethinking Heidegger's Engagement with Kant's Practical Reason

La libertad como lugar de la *Kehre*.
Replanteamiento de la confrontación de Heidegger con la razón
práctica kantiana

ALBERTO GUIDO GIOVANNI ZALI
(*Scuola Normale Superiore - Italia*)

Abstract: In a 1930 lecture course, Heidegger claims that the question of being is rooted in the problem of human freedom. Yet his engagement with practical reason has often been underexplored, in contrast to the attention devoted to other aspects of his dialogue with Kant. My paper aims to demonstrate that, despite its brief treatment in the *Kantbuch*, practical reason exerts a profound influence on Heidegger from the very outset. Focusing on the 1930 course and the 1943 essay on the essence of truth, I will highlight how the inversion of human freedom toward a freedom of Being depends on resolving a tension in the Kantian conception of freedom, conceived as an object of either knowledge or faith. This paves the way to rethinking the phenomenological and hermeneutical dimensions of freedom, their distinctive role in the *Kehre*, and their essential contribution to a history of practical reason yet to be written.

Key-words: Heidegger, Kant, practical reason, freedom of Being, hermeneutics

Resumen: En un curso de 1930, Heidegger sostiene que la cuestión del ser se arraiga en el problema de la libertad humana. Sin embargo, su relación con la razón práctica ha sido poco explorada en comparación con otros aspectos de su diálogo con Kant. Este artículo se propone demostrar que, pese a su breve tratamiento en el *Kantbuch*, la razón práctica influye profundamente en Heidegger desde el principio. Centrándome en el curso de 1930 y en el ensayo de 1943 sobre la esencia de la verdad, muestro cómo la inversión de la libertad humana hacia una libertad del Ser depende de resolver la tensión en la concepción kantiana de la libertad como objeto de fe o de conocimiento. Esto permite reconsiderar las dimensiones fenomenológica y hermenéutica de la libertad, su papel distintivo en la *Kehre* y su contribución esencial a una historia de la razón práctica aún por escribirse.

Palabras clave: Heidegger, Kant, razón práctica, libertad del ser, hermenéutica

1. Introduction

At the conclusion of his SS 1930 lecture course, Heidegger argues «the problem of the essence of human freedom is the fundamental problem of philosophy, where even the question of being is rooted»¹. Günter Figal, in a well-known study, has therefore described Heidegger's project as an overall philosophy of freedom². However, this dimension of his thought has not always been foregrounded, and even less attention has been paid to his engagement with other conceptions of freedom that informed his work. In the same vein, although Heidegger's dialogue with Kant has been extensively examined, his relation to practical reason has received comparatively little notice³. This is hardly surprising, since in the *Kantbuch* the issue is explicitly addressed only in §30. Even so, as I will argue, this topic exerts a far more pervasive influence on Heidegger's thought than this brief treatment suggests. It illuminates not only the proximity and the distance between Heidegger and Kant, but also the broader sense in which the *Sinnfrage* unfolds as a question of freedom, which thus turns out to be the very site where the *Kebr*e takes place and Heidegger's own theoretical tensions come to light.

To clarify these aspects, I first reconstruct a few moments prior to the 1930s in which Heidegger engaged directly with practical reason and appropriated some of its constitutive features (§2). I then show how these elements bear on a fundamental antinomy left unresolved by Kant (§3), and how Heidegger's resolution of it marks a breaking point in his thought and contributes to shaping the *Kebr*e. This insight finally leads to a further question: to what extent is Heidegger's approach to freedom hermeneutical rather than phenomenological?

2. Heidegger's appropriation of Practical Reason

In the early Freiburg courses, Kant is scarcely mentioned. A notable exception is the SS 1919 course on Neo-Kantianism, which, while primarily critical of Rickert and Windelband, includes a sympathetic passage on Lotze's philosophy. Lotze is presented as a key figure in "*Füch*teanzing" Kant's theoretical reason, that is, in interpreting it through a practical lens and thereby freeing

¹ GA 31, p. 300. All translations are my own.

² Figal, 1988, p. 275: «Heidegger's thought remains, to the very end, a thought of freedom, in the same measure as it is a thought of time».

³ See, for instance, De Blasi, 2000, p. 83, who argues that the *second Critique* is stepped in unconditional universality and thus only minimally, if at all, responsive to the demands of temporal finitude. The neglect of the practical dimension can already be tracked back to Cassirer, who at Davos read the *Kantbuch* primarily through the lens of imagination and temporality. Likewise, even two highly insightful interpreters such as Dahlstrom, 1991 and Carl, 2025, in their reconstructions of the Heidegger-Kant relationship, still assign only a marginal place to this theme. What is genuinely striking, however, is that in a comprehensive volume such as *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, this dimension is not addressed at all, except parenthetically in a brief paragraph (Polt, 2013, p. 40).

thought from the naturalistic snares in which it was caught during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Within Lotze's project to «relocate and ground logic in ethics»⁴, one can discern both Fichte's pivotal role in reviving the transcendental enterprise by interpreting theoretical reason as inherently practical, and an anticipation of Heidegger's attempt to investigate the question of the validity of judgment as developed in his early work *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*⁵. As we shall see, this is not unlike what Heidegger himself goes on to do in his SS 1930 course.

However, even if «the primacy of practical reason, the grounding of theoretical and scientific thought in practical belief and in the will to truth becomes the leading philosophical conviction of the philosophy of values» (GA 56/7: 143), Heidegger seeks to elaborate a «critical and phenomenological overcoming of the philosophy of values» (*ibid.*: 141), whose dead end is a sterile philosophy of culture. Whereas the *Notkriegssemester* course still distinguishes between a negative and a positive sense of the notion of value – between a secondary and theoreticist *für-Wert-erklären* and an authentic *Wertnehmen*, thanks to which life is genuinely enhanced⁶ – the situation is different in the following *Vorlesungen*. In the aforementioned 1919 lectures, the question arises whether «one could assume truth to be a value» (GA 56/57: 200). Heidegger asks, in continuity with a lively debate within Neo-Kantianism, whether the concept of being or of value should be given priority. Yet a philosophy of values cannot solve this antinomy: one must turn to an originary, pre-theoretical inquiry, in order to determine the meaning of expressions such as *sein* or *sollen*, which are taken for granted without being properly understood by Rickert and others.

If philosophy implies a reference to the truth, we might ask what value the corresponding knowledge holds for human life. In turn, this would require clarifying what it means for something to have value for human existence – a determination that is possible, once again, only within the scope of philosophy. Hence, the question concerning philosophy presents itself as more fundamental than that regarding the value of truth. Given that the WS 1920/21 lecture course maintains that the notion of value results from a process of theorization and that, «like all theorization, it must disappear from philosophy»⁷, one might hypothesize, with a slight overinterpretation, that, in attempting to determine the value of philosophy, Heidegger felt the need to suspend the notion

⁴ *Phänomenologie und Transzendente Wertphilosophie (Sommersemester 1919)*, in GA 56/57, p. 139. On Lotze and Heidegger, see Rabernik, 2007, pp. 153-169.

⁵ Here Heidegger, within a context that calls for further investigation, engages with Lotze's sentence: «Alongside a "this is", there is a "this counts" (*das gilt*). The form of reality of the identical factor identified in the process of judgment can only be value (*das Gelten*)». Cf. *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, in GA 1, *Frühe Schriften*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, pp. 59-187: 170. See also: Esposito, 2023, pp. 102-109.

⁶ *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (Notkriegssemester 1919)*, in GA 56-57, p. 48.

⁷ *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion (Wintersemester 1920/21)*, in GA 60, p. 16.

of value, regarding it as obscure and in any case derivative, in order to turn his attention to the co-implication between philosophy and life.

Moving closer to *Being and Time*, in the SS 1927 *Vorlesung*, Heidegger observes, in the context of a discussion on the Kantian concept of subjectivity, that the *I think* still adheres to Descartes' conception of a thinking subject whose being remains indeterminate. On the other hand, «from the interpretation of the I as a moral person we gain no actual insight into the mode of being of this I»⁸. In §59 of his major work, he likewise dismisses Kant's overly juridical understanding of moral conscience, an account modelled on the imagery of a tribunal. Indeed, such an analogy already carries «the sense of a 'realisation of values' or of 'the fulfilment of norms'»⁹, and thus obscures the phenomenon in its ontological structure. Surprisingly enough, Heidegger would keep employing the Kantian terminology of *Gewissen* to designate the condition of possibility for adopting an authentic stance toward existence. Moreover, in the SS 1930 course, he would warn against treating the categorical imperative as nothing more than an ethically inflected ideology shaped by the social conditions of the German Enlightenment, which would amount to understating the argumentative rigor behind its deduction (GA 31: 287). In parallel, «the essence of personhood» is said to consist of «responsibility toward oneself – a self-binding not egoistically referred to a contingent I» (*ibid.*: 293) but grounded in «willing the duty of the pure will». In clear contrast with the SS 1927 claim, Heidegger would add that with regard to *Dasein* «the essence of this specific *being* is disclosed through the voluntary will of the human person» (*ibid.*: 301).

There is more to it: while portraying autonomy, Heidegger resorts to a vocabulary drawn from the polarity of authenticity and inauthenticity, as he maintains that in every “ethically” relevant circumstance each is called to orient themselves toward the pure will, to the actualisation «of the *authentic* concrete willing» [*eigentlichen konkreten Wollens*] (*ibid.*: 285). Consequently, the precise formulations of the categorical imperative matter less than willing itself, conceived as «a proper mode of actual knowing and understanding» (*ibid.*: 289)¹⁰. It remains to be clarified how willing can be subsumed under understanding. For the moment, let us note that, according to Heidegger, Kant «experienced the peculiarity of actual willing as a *fact*, and this experience determines the whole issue of practical reason» (*ibid.*: 294).

⁸ GA 24, p. 201.

⁹ GA 2, p. 389.

¹⁰ As Heidegger writes later: «The formulation is always a philosophical interpretation, and several of these are possible, as even in Kant himself we encounter a range of different readings. [...] all aim to capture something essential and decisive concerning the facticity of the fact of human being in the authenticity of its essence» (*ibid.*: 601). According to Seol, 2019, pp. 1-17 Heidegger's reading of the second *Critique*, however, would capture only an initial layer of the issue: the indeterminacy of a pure willing. On this basis one would need to reestablish a level grounded in the principle of morality, thereby preserving the substantive force of the categorical imperatives. By contrast, I understand Heidegger's reading as already shaped by a determinate content, albeit of a different kind.

Some interpreters have argued that this hermeneutical shift could rest on a renewed awareness that Heidegger acquired during his *colloquia* with Cassirer at Davos¹¹. As a matter of fact, the Neo-Kantian professor pointed towards freedom as «the real capital problem of Kant»¹². What appears incomprehensible in the theoretical domain becomes, in the second *Critique*, the lever that allows us to force the narrow confines of phenomenal experience and to inhabit an intelligible realm. To situate freedom within temporal bounds would sever its anchorage to the absolute; it would lead to a defeatist form of relativism that abandons any claim to knowing what matters the most in life. Heidegger confined himself within finite being; what he finds is «only the fixation of the point of transition» (*ibid.*: 278). With a touch of provocation, Cassirer concludes: «I do not believe Heidegger can or wants to remain at this point». The seemingly solid insight that Heidegger might have been influenced by Cassirer, however, remains open to at least three objections:

- a. Heidegger already possessed an understanding of Kantian freedom at the time of the Davos debates. In the same year, he supervised Gerhard Krüger's dissertation on *Die Grundlegung der Kantischen Philosophie in der Ethik*, which devoted extensive attention to the problem of freedom. In 1927, Krüger also conducted a remarkable seminar on the same topic as part of a course on Schelling taught by Heidegger¹³. Moreover, Heidegger's response to Cassirer – urging a deeper inquiry into the meaning of the law in its constitutive role for the finitude of human being¹⁴ – is by no means off the cuff.
- b. The subsumption of willing under the structure of understanding has already been explored in SuZ §41, where an initial account of *Dasein* as care was offered: «in the phenomenon of willing», says Heidegger, «the underlying totality of care becomes manifest» (GA 2: 258). To add to this, in describing discourse as reduced to idle talk and volition to mere

¹¹ On Heidegger's 1930 summer-semester course as a response to Cassirer's criticism – particularly to the charge that he produced a wooden iron by speaking of a reason that is at once sensible, heteronomous, and autonomous – see the very informative essay of Shalow, 1986, pp. 155-165.

¹² *Davos Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger*, in GA 3, p. 276.

¹³ Krüger, 1929. A substantial extract was later published under the title *Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik* (Krüger, 1931). For the 1927 seminar, see Krüger, 2010. Krüger attended Heidegger's courses at least from 1923/24 onward, and in the *curriculum vitae* appended to his 1925 doctoral dissertation he lists Heidegger among his most influential teachers. In 1924, Krüger published a substantial two-part article on theology and morality in Kant (see Krüger 1924). As I have claimed elsewhere (Zali 2025), if anyone shaped Heidegger's appropriation of Kant, it was likely Krüger rather than Cassirer; on this topic, see also Grondin 2011.

¹⁴ As Heidegger claims: «The categorical imperative entails something that goes beyond the finite being. Yet the very concept of the imperative, as such, reveals its internal reference to a finite being. [...] This transcendence also still remains within what is created and finite» (GA 3, p. 279).

desire, whose satisfaction is first sought and then feared, he states that: «being-in-the-world whose world is primarily projected as a world of desires has irrevocably abandoned itself to what is available» (*ibid.*: 259). Entirely absorbed in the surrounding world, *Dasein* «still allows itself to be drawn toward possibilities». Now, I ask: is this not straightforwardly a variation of heteronomy? Are we not dealing with a modified version of autonomy, when authentic existence would later be identified with the *Gewissen-haben-wollen* (*ibid.*: 407)?

- c. In the aforementioned 1927 lectures, the moral feeling of respect is said to be «the authentic modality through which human existence manifests itself and not just in the sense of a mere acknowledgement, of a mere awareness, but in such a way that in respect I myself am, and I myself act» (GA 24, 194). The same applies to §30 of the *Kantbuch*, where respect stands for the «modality by which the law is made primarily accessible to us» (GA 3: 158). Every feeling is, in its structure, articulated in such a way that it always exhibits a causal “because” and a self, a feeling-of-oneself of the one who feels and is attuned to the character of that for which the feeling is experienced. When the “because” is the moral law, respect discloses the self as agent insofar as the law is given by reason itself as spontaneity. Heidegger states:

«In the respect for the law, I subject myself to myself. In this self-subjection, I am myself [...] as pure reason. In this subjection to myself, I elevate myself to myself, as a free being who determines itself» (*ibid.*: 159).

Active respect for the law is the way of making oneself responsible before one’s authentic self. One should note that the formal structure of respect recalls that of anxiety, as analysed in *Being and Time* and *What Is Metaphysics?*, for anxiety ensures a privileged opening of *Dasein*, which is brought before its own being thanks to this peculiar emotional attunement. Anxiety discloses the human being’s tendency to flee from itself, since the entities in which it had sought refuge collapse around it and no longer provide any support. The “because” of anxiety is not simply ontic: «it is so near that it oppresses us and takes our breath away, and yet it is nowhere» (GA 2: 248), for it is the very locality of Being itself and the world as such. In other words, anxiety is experienced as we are thrown into a world of possibilities which are anything but superficial occasions for a Pascalian *divertissement*. And what it reveals above all is this very condition of dispersion and fallenness.

Anxiety is thus more primordial than respect, which already presupposes a positive conception of the content of morality as the defining characteristic of the self. In Kantian terms, we would be dealing with something similar, and yet even more determined, in the feeling of the sublime as presented in the third *Critique*: that is, a sensation of being overwhelmed by an unfathomable nature that eludes all our attempts to conceptualise it, which nonetheless leads us to conceive of ourselves as inhabited by a more far-reaching capacity to think the

infinite – namely reason as the very faculty of thinking¹⁵.

This point could pave the way for exploring how Kant's distinction between a conceptualising intellect and reason is taken up by Heidegger, as he opposes unreflective scientific cognition to an originary form of thinking. Yet this would go far beyond the scope of the present analysis. For our purposes, it suffices to note that, as early as *Being and Time*, Heidegger conceives the structure of reason as a kind of practical self-affection in which the spontaneity of pure reason becomes manifest through the affective attunements capable of revealing one's own existential situatedness. Moreover, he had been developing this line of thought at least since 1924. In fact, in a conference on the concept of time, delivered before an audience of theologians in Marburg, he praises Kant for having determined the fundamental principle of ethics in a formal manner: «he perhaps knew from a familiarity with *Dasein* itself that *Dasein* is its *bon*»¹⁶. Even more explicitly, in an often overlooked passage from his SS 1924 *Vorlesungen* on Aristotle, he argues that the fact that *Dasein* forms its own being resonates with the Kantian definition of the human being as «the rational creature that exists as an end in itself»; that «such a definition represents the ontological condition of possibility for the categorical imperative»; and, ultimately, that if the rational creature

«is something open to the law within the fundamental determination of *respect*, and if, at the same time, its being is in a certain sense at its end in itself – that is, it has no ulterior aim –, then this law is the Ultimate in itself, the duty is *categorical* and not hypothetical. For the being of human being there is no “if”, but rather an *ultimate* “then”. [...] The maxim shall not become a law of nature in an explicit manner, but as a *mode of Dasein in an absolute senses*»¹⁷.

What is at stake here is not so much that Heidegger could not have developed his existential analytic without appropriating Kant's practical reason, for he was already working on it earlier, on Aristotelian grounds. Nor is it primarily that he employs the concept of *Gewissen* in a quasi-Kantian manner at a central point of his analytic, to show how the possibility of an authentic existence is made available to human beings. Rather, the issue concerns the interplay between practical reason, its ontological conditions of possibility, and the practical character of *Dasein*, which allows for a boustrophedonic dialogue between the two philosophers and hence permits us to interrogate Heidegger's thought from the standpoint of the modifications he introduces with respect to practical reason. Indeed, as we have begun to see, its actual

¹⁵ Kant, KU, p. 245: «If something arouses in us, merely in apprehension and without any rationalising on our part, a feeling of sublime, then it may indeed appear, in its form, contra-purposive for our power of judgment, incommensurate with our power of exhibition, and as it were violent for our imagination, and yet we judge it all the more sublime for that»; p. 246: «in general it indicates no purposiveness in nature itself, but only in the possible use of its apprehensions to make perceptible in ourselves a purposiveness that is entirely independent of nature».

¹⁶ GA 64, p. 117.

¹⁷ GA 18, pp. 95-96.

meaning undergoes some radical transformations, both in content and in form.

As for its content, in his 1929 essay on *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Heidegger portrays reason as constituting a “world” by projecting its idea, that is, by referring to «a totality whose content (reality) is not objectifiable into an image or an intuition»¹⁸, which transcends what is ontically given while never ceasing to be finite. However, this totality designates «the absolute whole of the object that is accessible to finite knowing»: it is tied to the unity of knowledge as the guiding comportment, in a way that presupposes a positive determination of its content with reference to the presence of beings. This is why the *Kantbuch* treats reason as derived from imagination and takes transcendental ideas to be contingent products of a projective faculty that misapprehends its own powers and limits¹⁹. Even though the existential concept of world presented by Kant in his “cosmic philosophy” comes closer to what Heidegger has in mind, insofar as it is grounded in what the human being «as a free-acting being, does or can and must do by itself» (*ibid.*: 153)²⁰, the question remains to what extent practical reason is tied to a universality which is nothing other than the possibility of coherently ordering beings within a whole. Before and against any complacent belief in our capacity to extend worldly knowledge and control indefinitely, we should become aware of how empty such an endeavour may prove. This is also why anxiety is not only more originary than respect: it stands in opposition to it. Consequently, Kant’s concept of personhood fails to illuminate our mode of being, even if it appears formally correct. This perspective, however, depends on a substantial modification of the form itself.

3. Transcendental and practical freedom: between knowledge and faith

As several interpreters have noted, a central thesis of the SS 1930 lecture course is that, contrary to Kant’s claim, freedom is not a specific form of causality; rather, causality itself is grounded in freedom. As Heidegger puts it: once freedom is grasped as a metaphysical problem, «it becomes questionable whether freedom should be conceived as a form of causality, or whether, on the contrary, causality itself is a problem of freedom» (GA 31: 299)²¹. Much has been written about the meaning of this paradoxical claim, particularly as to whether it anticipates the *Kebre* by already thinking Being as *das Freie*, a dimension where things occur in full freedom, without a reason – echoing a line from Angelus Silesius, especially dear to Heidegger. Yet a careful analysis of the

¹⁸ *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in GA 9, p. 149.

¹⁹ On finitude, imagination and reason in Heidegger’s misinterpretation of Kant, cf. Ferrarin, 2015, pp. 12-19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*: 153 (quoted from KANT, ApH, p. 119).

²¹ This thesis has been most clearly set out by Esposito, 2004 and more recently by La Rocca, 2022. Sections of this course have been discussed by Chiareghin, 1983; Brisart, 1990; Vigo, 2010; Pietropaoli, 2016; Espinet, 2018.

lecture course shows that, although this clearly bears on the Turn, it would be premature at this stage to speak of *das Freie*. What is at stake here is still human freedom and its formal structure, which is all the more significant for interpreting the freedom of Being as well²².

By identifying certain distinctive features of freedom, traditionally understood as independence both from the world – that is, from the totality of nature and history as governed by causal laws – and from God, i.e. as autonomy in relation to him (*ibid.*: 6), Heidegger proceeds to show how this question is meant to provide an access to philosophy as a whole. He offers two arguments. The first holds that, if freedom indeed entails a relation to the world and God, even if only a negative one, its problem cannot be exhausted by the particular sciences (for instance, physics or, in more contemporary terms, neurophysiology). This allows Heidegger to discern a negative and a positive concept of freedom, namely independence and the capacity to establish positive relations. The second argument is more complex and occupies the first third of the seminar.

The initial step taken by Heidegger is to set aside the aforementioned negative definition so as to examine a second, more Kantian one. Hence, he distinguishes between a cosmological and a practical sense of freedom: while the first one coincides with a «capacity to initiate a state of one's own accord, whose causality is not subordinated, according to the natural law, to another cause determining it in temporal sequence»²³, the second is an «independence of the *Willkür* from the compulsion exerted by the *stimuli* of sensibility» (*KrV* A534/B562). This duplicity does not coincide with that between positive and negative freedom, for practical freedom is at the same time «a capacity within the human being to determine itself of its own accord». The distinction between positive and negative freedom, therefore, appears to lie within the sphere of practical freedom. But this is not entirely correct: cosmological or transcendental freedom, as Heidegger points out, is itself «absolute spontaneity – i.e. the capacity to initiate a state of one's own accord; autonomy as the capacity for self-legislation of the rational will» (GA 31: 24). Not only do both formulations include a reference to spontaneity, but, more fundamentally, practical freedom is also said to be a particular instantiation of its transcendental concept. As Kant puts it:

«On this transcendental idea of freedom rests the practical concept of freedom itself, and [...] the transcendental aspect constitutes in this [practical] one the very core of the difficulties that have always surrounded the question of its possibility» (*KrV* A533/B561).

Here, the priority assigned to transcendental freedom makes it necessary to address it first. It is not possible within the scope of this paper to follow Heidegger's line of argument in all its details. To briefly summarize: 1. Freedom is said to be a specific form of causality, and causality means letting something

²² Building on the polarity identified by La Bella, 2017.

²³ Kant, *KrV*, A 533/B 561.

happen, that is, setting something into motion; 2. Motion is then examined through an analysis of its more originary Aristotelian characterisation; 3. Since motion is related to the totality of being (a clear misreading of Aristotle, yet consistent with Heidegger's interpretation of the Stagirite since his Marburg lectures), the inquiry is thereby led toward being qua being; 4. From this point, one can pose the fundamental *Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins*, that is, reprise the basic problematic of *Being and Time*; 5. Heidegger offers a striking insight into his major work, claiming that any understanding of Being depends on a more or less adequate grasp of temporality; 6. Understanding also implies projection, that is, the freedom to project a horizon of possibilities at once theoretical and practical. Here we encounter the second argument mentioned earlier for taking freedom as an object – or rather as *the* object – of philosophical inquiry. And here, finally, the claim with which this paper began comes fully into view: the question of Being has its root in the problem of freedom.

This should suffice to show that, when Heidegger treats causality as a matter of freedom, he is referring to a distinctively human freedom: the freedom to understand Being or to “ground” it, as in Heidegger's 1929 essay on the essence of ground (Ga 9: 163). Yet we should be cautious before drawing any firm conclusions, since in the second and third parts of the lecture course Heidegger turns, in a dialogical manner, to Kant's transcendental and practical determinations of freedom, in a way that may well broaden our understanding of the matter at stake.

The first point to note is that practical freedom is tightly bound to the problem of free causality. If the latter were not possible, human freedom would amount to an empty chimera. Hence, after recalling the argument of the Third Antinomy – namely, that one can demonstrate either that it is possible to conceive of a free causation or that only natural causes do exist, and that both demonstrations proceed by indirectly refuting the opposite claim – Heidegger sets out a twofold solution to this dilemma. On the one hand, the synthetic ambitions of pure reason are curtailed, since it is only a logical postulate that, together with the conditioned state, the entire regressive series of its condition is also given. On the other hand, this solution ultimately depends on the renowned distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Because the former rests on the latter, Heidegger argues that «the key to this solution lies in the distinction between appearance and thing in itself, which brings together the problem of the *finitude* of knowledge» (GA 31: 237). Here, knowledge is to be understood as “scientific” knowledge, or more broadly as a kind of knowledge that concerns beings in their sheer presence, thereby amounting to an inauthentic way of comprehending and projecting temporality. In order to make room for freedom, one must bracket the “naturalistic” comprehension of nature, and ultimately nature itself understood as a causal determination according to laws.

Secondly, Heidegger asserts that Kant «did not pursue the question of finitude in a sufficiently originary manner, even though it is from – indeed for – this finitude that the project of the first *Critique* takes shape» (*ibid.*: 168). Rather,

he opted for a crude and unclarified juxtaposition of temporality and the I, withdrawing from the abyss that binds them together: i.e. imagination, according to the thesis defended in the *Kantbuch*. If Kant examines the cosmological path first, it is because his perspective remains anchored in an ontology of presence, so that the human being – despite its privileged status – is nothing more than a subordinate entity among others. This becomes evident as soon as Kant calls freedom «a suprasensible object of the category of causality»²⁴. The possibility of cosmological freedom is not neutral with respect to the content of its practical enactment, which is itself a peculiar mode of *causation*. It is also worth recalling that Heidegger already criticised the undue transposition of categories from the theoretical to the practical domain in a note to *Sein und Zeit*, where he asked whether a genuine understanding of *Dasein* is forfeited once categories are carried over into the practical domain and, «by virtue of the primacy of practical reason, they find a new application unburdened by naturalistic rationalism»²⁵.

From Heidegger's perspective, the reliance on transcendental freedom as a negative condition of possibility (or, better, of non-impossibility) compromises the practical path, which otherwise emerges as an alternative to the natural order. This constraint prevents Kant from drawing out the metaphysical implications of this second path and from positively sketching a metaphysics of finitude, as per the expression employed in the fourth section of the *Kantbuch*. The outcome of such a deficiency, as is most clearly shown in the *Vorlesungen* on Nietzsche, would be the transition from good or pure will to the will-to-power as the will-to-will. Accordingly, Kantian *Wille* would evolve into a «self-effecting process that tends toward itself through self-representation (will-to-will)»²⁶, which also designates the fundamental trait of beingness as configured in each act of willing, thereby functioning as a condition of its intensification, and whose origin lies «in the essential ignorance of the essence of truth as the truth of being». I will return to the meaning of the latter expression in the following section.

The assumptions underlying these claims are even more significant, and they come to the fore in the second, more condensed section devoted to practical freedom. In his *Grundlegung*, Kant had claimed that «freedom neither is nor can be a concept of experience, since it always persists even though experience shows the opposite of those requirements that are represented as necessary under the presupposition of freedom»²⁷. The second *Critique* is more ambiguous and oscillates between divergent conceptions: at times, freedom is said to be a postulate of reason, required by moral conscience for it to be intelligible; in other passages, it is taken to coincide with the effectiveness of the law (i.e. of practical reason) within us²⁸. Heidegger himself recognises this tension: on the

²⁴ Kant, KpV, V 9. Heidegger comments on this passage in GA 31, p. 190.

²⁵ Heimsoeth, 1924, pp. 31-32 (quoted by Heidegger in GA 2, p. 424).

²⁶ *Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik*, in GA 6.2, p. 426.

²⁷ Kant, GMS, p. 455.

²⁸ According to Chiereghin, 1991, p. 113, what is postulated is a positive use of freedom and

one hand, freedom «is itself the legislation, pure will, autonomy», and on the other, it represents the «condition of possibility of the facticity of pure practical freedom» (GA 31: 296). Whereas the passage that articulates conscience and freedom in terms of the *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio essendi* of morality shows that completely identifying the former with the latter is at least problematic²⁹, Heidegger nevertheless opts for this very view (*ibid.*: 297).

This possibility is sustained by the concluding paragraph of the third *Critique*. Within a context which distinguishes between things that can merely be opined, that can be believed or, instead, actually be known, Kant defines the latter as «objects for concepts whose objective reality can be demonstrated» (KU, V 456) or intuitively made present within an experience. Among them, there is freedom, whose reality «can be demonstrated through practical laws of pure reason, and in conformity with these in effective actions, thus within experience» (*ibid.*: 457). And, still more incisively, freedom is said to be «the sole idea of pure reason, whose object is a fact, and which must be counted among *sibilia*» (*ibid.*: 454). Heidegger is thus fully justified in concluding that Kant «*experienced* the specificity of the actually voluntary as a *fact* and on the basis of this experience he determined the problem of practical reason in an essential way» (GA 31: 294, my emphasis). Still, we should bear in mind that this is only one of the two possibilities opened up by Kant and arguably the more debatable one. As noted by Anne-Marie Roviello, in his first *Critique* Kant hypothesized that we could be free with respect to the *stimuli* of sensibility, and yet still forced to act in a determined manner by an unknown *noumenal* cause – which she views as a variant of the Cartesian evil genius³⁰. Likewise, Markus Kohl has argued that a proof of freedom's effectiveness grounded in a phenomenology of moral deliberation does not amount to a proof at all – at least not for Kant, who deems appearances to be distinct from things in themselves³¹. One should ask whether the same applies to Heidegger, as he holds fast not to the *noumenon*, but to Being in its difference from entities. Hence, bracketing nature would not suffice to set aside all possibly relevant forces, such as the history of Being, which could appear as a necessary fate that denies freedom. However, this is evidently not the path chosen by Heidegger.

If freedom is immediately knowable, it should serve as the standpoint from which to understand Being as what enables its existence. Consequently, everything ought to be seen from the point of view of freedom. Ultimately, theoretical activity would itself appear as a modification of an originary pre-theoretical

not transcendental freedom of the pure will. Cunico, 2019, p. 101 recognises this thesis as consistent with passages within Kant's work and yet counts many other contradictory instances (KpV, V 168; 179; 193). The ambiguity of this postulate would amount to its status as a direct presupposition of moral law, contrary to immortality of the soul and existence of God as indirectly inferred from the highest good as its object.

²⁹ As Kant declares: «Here I am not asking whether they are in fact distinct, nor whether an unconditioned law is simply self-awareness of pure practical reason, nor whether the latter is entirely identical with the positive concept of freedom» (KpV, V 52).

³⁰ Roviello, 1984, p. 111.

³¹ Kohl, 2014.

orientation, and it would be understood as intrinsically free. This has many consequences for the way we conceive of causation. The analogies of experience and hence the principle of causality, insofar as they determine the being of objectual entities, subject us to a necessity that «can be encountered as a constraint only because it is confronted by a being that is from the outset free for it» (*ibid.*: 59). And immediately thereafter: «in the essence of the pure intellect, i.e. in pure theoretical reason, there is already freedom, if freedom means submitting to a necessity after having spontaneously imposed it upon oneself». In the conclusion of the course, Heidegger even integrates these claims into his own thought, as he maintains that «freedom is the condition of possibility for the manifestness of the being of entities, for the understanding of being» (*ibid.*: 303).

4. The Turn into freedom

Someone once told me that great philosophers circle the same question all their lives, moving in a widening spiral that brings the old ever closer to the heart of the new. Through a historical reconstruction, I have sought to show how practical reason was always a compelled starting point for Heidegger, as the most appropriate ground on which to develop his project of elaborating an ontology of factical life. Indeed, one might be tempted to recognize a Kantian heritage in the very decision to refer to the human condition as *Faktizität*. The formal and structural analogy between the moral feeling of respect and existential anxiety suggests that we should seriously consider the possibility that, at least since 1923, Heidegger had in mind the *einzigste Factum der Vernunft* (KpV, V 31). This would justify why he continues to talk about *Gewissen*, even when he is deeply engaged in differentiating his own analysis from a merely ethical one. In the conclusion of his WS 1927/28 lecture course, Heidegger explicated his debt by stating:

«When, a few years ago, I returned to the *Critique* and read it again, so to speak, against the background [*vor dem Hintergrund*] of Husserl's phenomenology, [...] Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the correctness of the path I was pursuing»³².

³² GA 25, p. 431. I am grateful to a reviewer for pointing out that *vor dem Hintergrund* can imply not only reading Kant in counterpoint to Husserl but also interpreting Kantian philosophy in the light of Husserlian phenomenology, thereby softening the opposition to the latter (for an example of such a reading: Kinkaid, 2018). While these two interpretative paths are compatible, this paper focuses on the former: a choice warranted by Heidegger's early 1920s critique of the dyadic noesis-noema relation, which he replaces with a triadic structure of reference (*Bezug*), content (*Inhalt*), and a fundamental pre-theoretical sense of enactment (*Vollzugsinn*). As noted by Perego, 2001, p. 13, the affinity between certain Kantian passages and Heidegger's theses in the second half of the 1920s «even gives rise to the suspicion that Heidegger did not always fully acknowledge his debt to Kant».

The expression *vor dem Hintergrund* suggests both that Husserl permitted a specific reading of Kant and that this interpretation of Kant can remedy Husserl's deficiency. Considering that what is seemingly lacking in Husserlian phenomenology is a proper account of the practical meaning of his theoretical orientation, one can safely assume that this claim alludes to practical reason. Yet, as shown in the previous section of this essay, such a return to Kant amounts to an appropriative transformation of his categories. Moreover, it implies that freedom ceases to be a mere postulate and becomes an evidence given in every relevant act: namely, whenever we are urged to decide between divergent possibilities. Apart from a few brief and rather marginal remarks in the sketches for the WS 1931/32 course, neither the highest good nor the postulatory doctrine is ever mentioned, let alone analysed by Heidegger³³. On the other hand, this move extends the scope of freedom to theoretical reason. We are thus left with two options: either freedom carries no distinctive duty, or freedom is realised not only when our conduct proves to be appropriate, but also when our thinking is correct – specifically, in this context, when we properly meditate on Being. Yet what is the relation between freedom and Being?

To answer this question, we must now examine the connection between the 1930 course and the lecture *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, delivered four times between 1930 and 1932 (with variations now accessible in the *Gesamtausgabe*), and regarded in a 1943 note as the originating moment of the Turn³⁴. This connection is highly significant, not only for this reason, but also because Heidegger intended to revise his major work using the SS 1930 lectures as a point of departure. This makes them an especially compelling site for tracing continuity within the discontinuity of the Turn³⁵. For the sake of brevity, I will confine myself to the version published in *Wegmarken*.

Just as in *Sein und Zeit* (§44), the first step in gaining insight into the essence of truth requires reformulating the “Aristotelian” thesis according to which the proposition is the locus of truth. It is therefore necessary to trace it back to its existential ground: «the relation (*Beziehung*) of representational assertion to the thing is the enactment of a prior relation (*Verhältnis*), which is always already set in motion as a comportment (*Verhalten*)»; «every comportment is constantly open to beings» (GA 9: 184). This also aligns with what emerged at the end of the previous section: the freedom of *Dasein* is the presupposition for the existence of causal constraint, or more broadly, for the manifestness of being. Things can be encountered only within an openness that allows them to appear. Still, this open space is not produced by an objectifying representation; rather, representation is one peculiar way of inhabiting it, a specific realisation within a wider range of possibilities: «depending on the kind of entity and manner

³³ *Kants transzendental Dialektik und die praktische Philosophie* (Wintersemester 1931/32), in GA 84.1, pp. 255-259; see also *Hauptstücke aus Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Sommersemester 1934), *ibid.*, pp. 323-335.

³⁴ Cf. respectively *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, in GA 80.1, pp. 329-428; *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, in GA 9, pp. 177-202: 193.

³⁵ Von Herrmann, 1994, p. 6.

of comportment, the constant openness of the human being is different». In this sense, as stated in the *Vorlesung*, freedom is not a property of human beings. On the contrary, the human being is only a «steward of freedom» (GA 31: 134). The following section of the essay turns to the essence of freedom, which represents the very core of manifestness, or the essence of truth in the sense of *alētheia*:

«Freedom with respect to what is manifest within an openness allows the entity to be the entity it is. Freedom now discloses itself as letting beings be. [...] Letting-be is allowing oneself to be engaged by beings. [...] Allowing oneself to be engaged in the unconcealment of beings does not mean losing oneself in it; it rather brings about a stepping-back before the entity, so that it may show itself as what it is and how it is» (GA 9: 188-189).

It is worth noting that, in the 1943 edition, Heidegger adds two notes to clarify the meaning of letting-be. The first one requires interpretation in terms of «granting (*gewähren*) – safeguarding (*Wahrnis*)»; accordingly, it should not be understood «as acting at the ontic level, but as taking, considering being (*Sein*) as Being (*Seyn*)». The second one explains that allowing ourselves to be engaged means that we «let that which is present be present in its own way, without adding or interposing anything new». Whereas human beings are accustomed to projecting themselves in ways that interpret things for their own convenience and even to understanding Being as something at hand, they are now called upon to set aside all such interpretations so as to become free. Far from broadening the scope of freedom beyond Kant, as hinted before, Heidegger appears instead to confine it: freedom is accessed only through the narrow passage of thinking Being. Moreover, given that Being transcends what is manifested at each moment, and true thinking recognises «the simple fact that the mystery as such (the concealing of what is concealed) permeates and governs the *Dasein* of human being» (*ibid.*: 194) – resoluteness or freedom toward death as the extreme possibility of being-there is bound to pass over into «re-soluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) for mystery» (*ibid.*: 198). From here on, human freedom would be conceived as «an abandonment to mildness which does not refuse the concealment of being in its totality» (*ibid.*: 199), or, going by the expression of the eponymous 1959 essay, as the resolute *Gelassenheit* that turns the will-to-have-conscience into a not-willing, which, in relinquishing one's own self-centred attitude, lets Being be what and how it is in itself ³⁶. However, the relationship between freedom and Being extends beyond this.

One final point that deserves attention is the fact that, at the conclusion of both texts, the same quotation from Kant's *Grundlegung* is reproduced, albeit in different contexts and with a different meaning: «here philosophy must demonstrate its purity as the holder of its own laws from itself and not as the guardian

³⁶ Zur *Erörterung der Gelassenheit*. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken (1944/45), in GA 13, p. 39: «You require a non-willing in the sense of an abdication of willing, so that through it we can be led back to the sought-after essence of thinking, which is not a willing, or at least be prepared for this encounter».

of those suggested to it by an innate sense or by some tutelary nature» (GMS, IV 425; GA 31, p. 303; GA 9, p. 200)³⁷. In the first occurrence, no additional comment is provided as this is indeed the conclusive sentence of the course. We may assume that Heidegger agrees with it to a certain extent, since his aim from the outset was to introduce philosophy in its radical, even aggressive mode of inquiry. In the final section of the 1943 essay, by contrast, he sets himself apart from his predecessor by asserting:

«Whether philosophy fulfils its initially determined essence as the “holder of its own laws” or whether it is itself first held and destined to be held by the truth of that of which its laws are always laws, is decided by the primacy with which the original essence of truth becomes essential for the questioning of thought».

Whenever Heidegger engages with Kant, his reading proceeds as if through a bifocal lens. Kant undoubtedly perceives something decisive such as the formal structure of volition. Yet he fails to draw the deepest consequences from what he discovers, as occurs with imagination, temporality and other key notions. Hence Heidegger can say that Kant «casts his gaze into a domain that, given his metaphysical grounding in subjectivity, he could only grasp from within that framework and was thereby compelled to interpret as the self-maintenance of its own laws». Still, «his insight into the vocation of philosophy is broad enough to reject any ensnaring of its thinking». Within the context of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, however, this double vision is reoriented. What comes to the fore is the positive redefinition of philosophy’s task: philosophy is no longer the keeper of its own laws, as it becomes the keeper of the safeguarding of Being – something that, in turn, grants the very possibility of philosophical inquiry. While inquiring into truth, the philosopher comes to realise that the truth, in which he dwells, is nothing other than the manifestation of Being. This shift in perspective is succinctly captured by a sentence in the conclusive appendix: «the essence of truth is the truth of essence» (*ibid.*: 201). And, insofar as the essence of truth has been equated with the essence of freedom, it is possible to assume that the latter would also invert into the freedom of Essence, namely, into the dynamic manifestation of Being.

As a matter of fact, the freedom of *Dasein* comes to require the freedom of Being. As Kant had recognized, for finite freedom to be possible, a transcending horizon must have made room for it. If so, two options are left: either we are free by chance or by some flaw within a mysterious and yet un-free universe, in which case our freedom would seem devoid of any given meaning; or we should interpret Being as safeguarding the free enactment of freedom, understood as the very possibility of safeguarding Being in turn. Heidegger advocates for the latter, as he depicts the elusiveness of Being as mitigated by the awareness of an assignment notified by the call of conscience. In some overlooked passages of the following works, Heidegger will thus refer to a *Freiheit*, which opens a dimension, das *Freie*, within which entities are permitted to happen for the benefit of

³⁷ The striking recurrence is highlighted in the insightful study of Camera, 2022.

human beings and for the safeguarding of Being through them. One compelling example could be the following passage from the *Schwarze Hefte*:

«As long as we determine the essence of freedom through a contrast – by necessity, compulsion or servitude – we have not yet entered into the Free [Freie]. The essence of freedom is the Freyheit of the re-lation [Ver-Hältnisses] that preserves and holds the fore-reserve [Vor-rau] of the event. The shelteringconcealing fore-reserve of the event is the riddle, the Freye. Freyheit: the eventing disclosure-safeguard [Wahrnis] of the relation»³⁸.

Once a postulatory and overly legalistic conception of Being is set aside, freedom opens onto a meaning no longer determined by opposition to necessity: namely, onto the re-lation constitutive of the *Er-eignis*, as the co-belonging of *Dasein* and Being. Yet, if freedom is not merely the absence of constraint or sheer unboundedness – if, that is, *Dasein* is to be free in a way that preserves a polarity between positive and negative freedom and thus retains an opposition akin to that between autonomy and heteronomy –, then Being must itself possess a form of free volition. To put it otherwise, Being must *love* and thereby enable thinking as something distinct from it (GA 9: 316). Unless the mystery of Being receives further determination, there arises a risk of fusion in which both human freedom and the freedom of Being would collapse into an undifferentiated unity, as the former would then become a mere part of the latter³⁹. To extend this framework beyond Heidegger, the semantics of freedom can be mapped onto his reading of Kant. Practical freedom corresponds to the freedom of *Dasein*, while transcendental freedom reflects the freedom of *Seyn*. Concurrently, negative freedom marks reciprocal independence, whereas positive freedom entails establishing a co-belonging: not as self-legislation, but as the response to a call originating from an inwardness always already appropriated by the *Ereignis*. Although the full implications of this positive freedom cannot be explored here, a preliminary indication is offered by Heidegger's recurrent adage: *Denken ist Danken*.

5. Conclusion: between phenomenology and hermeneutics

Heidegger is explicit that his phenomenology is hermeneutical from the very outset of *Sein und Zeit* (§7). What he means is that *Dasein* allows its “interpretative structures” to appear as they are, prior to being concealed by historical

³⁸ *Anmerkungen VIII*, in GA 98, p. 302 [158]. Heidegger's use of *Freyheit* with a y deliberately evokes an archaic German spelling. Through this chronological “stepping-back”, he suggests an ontological ascent toward an originary freedom that has always held sway over historical existence.

³⁹ Esposito, 2004, p. 125: «Finally, the fact that the freedom of human existence is the freedom of Being to manifest itself implies the necessity of their loss – that is, the loss of both Being and of freedom itself». By contrast, Casucci, 2007, p. 125 believes that «freedom here is originary in giving itself to thought as *Ereignis*, that is, as an over-abundance that presents itself to thinking as such, never offering itself to any possible calculation or objectifying evaluation».

misunderstandings. He employs the term *Auslegung*, which denotes both interpretation and the literal “laying out” or unfolding of meaning. Against this backdrop, although it may seem unusual to characterize Heidegger’s radical stance toward the mystery of Being as strictly phenomenological rather than hermeneutical, his thought issues an injunction to step back, to refrain from interpreting this concealment, so as to let it manifest itself precisely as such.

What has been argued here regarding freedom complicates this detachment, showing that it is impossible to accept its givenness *sic et simpliciter*. In truth, any appropriation of freedom is always already a hermeneutical wager. Hence, what is asserted here is the sheer inevitability of interpreting Being: an interpretative move that, from a strict Heideggerian point of view, would represent the very millennial error of metaphysics, namely, the reduction of Being to an entity and, ultimately, to *Dasein*. To acknowledge this inevitability requires moving beyond a purely descriptive stance, thereby recognizing that a postulatory moment remains necessary for the safeguarding of freedom. Indeed, a form of primordial faith cannot be entirely dispensed with, even if Heidegger attempted to do so. Accordingly, the question arises as to the extent to which an approach that insists on the givenness of freedom can still be regarded as phenomenology proper, or whether it inevitably slides into a positive, determined interpretation of Being – one driven by the need to preserve the phenomenon of freedom, by realizing it within a particular comprehension. Ironically, Heidegger himself turns out to be “hermeneutical”, albeit in a sense radically distinct from his own definition of the term.

In any case, even if Heidegger’s attempt to appropriate Kantian freedom must ultimately run aground, this failure proves highly instructive. It allows us to gain insight into an unresolvable tension at the heart of Kant’s conception of freedom, while providing a clearer understanding of Heidegger’s thought as a whole. Finally, it compels us to reflect on the complex, intertwined relation between knowledge and faith, or phenomenology and hermeneutics, highlighting two indispensable, non-negotiable moments within a “history of practical reason” yet to be written.

References

All references to Heidegger’s works are to the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann), while Kant’s works are cited from the edition of the *Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer). These details will therefore not be repeated each time.

BRISART, Robert (1990). “Nature et liberté dans l’ontologie fondamentale de Heidegger. De la radicalisation d’une antinomie moderne à l’acosmisme existentiel”. *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, vol. 88, pp. 524-552.

- CAMERA, Francesco (2022). "La libertà donata. Note a 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' di Martin Heidegger", in BIRNO, Omar, FORLIVESI, Marco (ed.). *Finitudine senza dogmi. Studi offerti a Roberto Garaventa*. Brescia: Morcelliana, pp. 99-113.
- CARL, Wolfgang (2025). "Heideggers Zuflucht bei Kant. Das Kant-Buch von 1929". *Kant-Studien*, vol. 116, n° 2, pp. 174-204.
- CASUCCI, Marco (2007). *L'essenza della libertà in Martin Heidegger*. Lanciano: Rocco Carabba.
- CHIEREGHIN, Franco (1983). *Il problema della libertà. Note a margine a Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*. Padova: Nuova Vita.
- CHIEREGHIN, Franco (1991). *Il problema della libertà in Kant*. Trento: Verifiche.
- CUNICO, Gerardo (2019). *La speranza e il senso. Metafisica e ermeneutica in Kant*. Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
- DAHLSTROM, Daniel (1991). "Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes to His Commentary on the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*". *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 45, n° 2, pp. 329-361.
- DE BLASI, Luigi (2000). "Il Kant di Heidegger". *Studi Kantiani*, vol. 13, pp. 67-92.
- ESPINET, David (2018). "Heidegger lecteur de Kant, Points de vue privés et publics à partir de 1930". *Archives de Philosophie*, vol. 81, pp. 353-372.
- ESPOSITO, Costantino (2004). „Kausalität als Freiheit: Heidegger liest Kant“. *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 20, pp. 101-125.
- ESPOSITO, Costantino (2023). "L'ontologia", in FABRIS, Adriano (ed.). *Heidegger*. Roma: Carocci, pp. 101-129.
- FERRARIN, Alfredo (2015). *The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and The Idea of Cosmic Philosophy*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
- FIGAL, Günther (1988). *Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit*. Frankfurt: Athenäum.
- GRONDIN, Jean (2011). "Heidegger et Krüger. Pour une autre histoire de la métaphysique". *Archives de Philosophie*, vol. 74, n° 1, pp. 109-128.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 1 (1978), *Frühe Schriften*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 2 (1977), *Sein und Zeit*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 3 (1991), *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 6.2 (1997), *Nietzsche*, ed. Brigitte Schillbach.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 9 (1976), *Wegmarken*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 13 (2002), *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910-1976)*, ed. Hermann Heidegger.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 24 (1975), *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Sommersemester 1927)*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 25 (1977), *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Wintersemester 1927/1928)*, ed. Ingrid Gölrand.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 31 (1982), *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, ed. Hartmut Tietjen.

- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 56/57 (1987), *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Heimbüchel.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 60 (1995), *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, ed. Matthias Jung und Thomas Regehly.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 64 (2004), *Der Begriff der Zeit*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 80.1 (2016), *Vorträge*, ed. Günther Neumann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 84.1 (2013), *Seminare. Kant - Leibniz - Schiller*, ed. Günther Neumann.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 98 (2018), *Anmerkungen VI-IX (Schwarze Hefte 1948/49-1951)*, ed. Peter Trawny.
- HEIMSOETH, Heinz (1924). „Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie“, in AA.VV. (eds.), *Immanuel Kant. Festschrift zu dem zweiten Jahrhundert seines Geburtstages*. Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- KANT, Immanuel, ApH (1917), *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, in Id. *Gesammelte Schriften. Band VII*.
- KANT, Immanuel, KrV (1973), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften. Band III*.
- KANT, Immanuel, KpV (1974), *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften. Band V*.
- KANT, Immanuel, KU (1974), in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften. Band V*.
- KANT, Immanuel, GMS (1991), *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften. Band IV*.
- KINKAID, James (2018). “Phenomenology, idealism, and the legacy of Kant”. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 27, n° 3, pp. 593-614.
- KOHL, Markus (2014). “Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason”. *Kant Studien*, vol. 105, n° 3, pp. 313-335.
- KRÜGER, Gerhard (1924). „Kant und die Theologie der Krisis“. *Theologische Blätter*, erste Teil, vol. 3, n° 5, pp. 97-105; und zweite Teil, vol. 3, n° 6, pp. 121-128.
- KRÜGER, Gerhard (1929). *Die Grundlegung der kantischen Philosophie in der Ethik*. University Library of Tübingen: unpublished.
- KRÜGER, Gerhard (1931). *Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- KRÜGER, Gerhard (2010). „Kants Lehre von der Freiheit zum Guten und zum Bösen“, in HÜHN, Lore und JANTZEN, Jorg (eds.). *Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927-28)*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 403-415.
- LA BELLA, Laura (2017). “Trascendenza umana e libertà dell'Essere: prospettive dell'interpretazione heideggeriana di Kant a partire da Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (SS 1930)”. *Scenari*, vol. 6, pp. 40-74.
- LA ROCCA, Claudio (2022). „Heideggers kategorischer Imperativ“, in SEUBERT, Harald, MASSA, Manuela, and DE VITA, Valentina (eds.). *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit der Freiheit. Kant und Heidegger über Freiheit, Willen und Recht*. Nürnberg: Seubert Verlag, pp. 333-357.
- PEREGO, Vittorio (2001). *Finitezza e libertà. Heidegger interprete di Kant*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

- PIETROPAOLI, Matteo (2016). "L'uomo in quanto una possibilità della libertà. Sul corso di Heidegger Dell'essenza della libertà umana (1930)". *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, vol. 3, pp. 543-563.
- POLT, Richard (2013). "Heidegger in the 1930s: Who Are We?", in RAFFOUL, François, and NELSON, Eric (eds.). *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*. London: Bloomsbury Press, pp. 39-46,
- RABERNIK Pavel (2007). *Heidegger interprete di Kant. Finitezza e fondazione della metafisica*. Pisa: ETS.
- ROVIELLO, Anne-Marie (1984). *L'institution kantienne de la liberté*. Bruxelles: Ousia.
- SEOL, Min (2019). "Ethical Lessons from Heidegger's Phenomenological Reading of Kant's Practical Philosophy". *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, vol. 51, pp. 1-17.
- SHALOW, Frank (1986). "Toward a Concrete Ontology of Practical Reason in Light of Heidegger's Lecture on Human Freedom". *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 17, n° 2, pp. 155-165.
- VIGO, Alejandro G. (2010). "Libertad como causa. Heidegger, Kant y el problema metafísico de la libertad". *Anuario Filosófico*, vol. 43, pp. 161-181.
- VON HERRMAN, Friedrich-Wilhelm (1994). *Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst*. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.
- ZALI, Alberto Guido Giovanni (2025) (ed.). "Martin Heidegger e Gerhard Krüger (Carteggio 1925-1963)". *Giornale di metafisica*, vol. 47, n° 2, pp. 471-515.